A fictional network of 5 medical aesthetic cosmetology clinics in Kyiv (injectables, energy-based rejuvenation, skincare, laser hair removal, diagnostics). The company is fictional, but the whole economy is assembled from real Ukrainian 2026 sources — Kyiv clinic price lists, salaries, rent, taxes, the 2021–2026 macro series — and documented in a source register. Every figure carries a tag: [S] market fact · [M] my assumption · [D] derived.
Money is in UAH ₴2026. FX for reference $ figures — official NBU rate on 8 September 2026: 1 USD ≈ 44.5 ₴. The legal structure is derived from market analysis: LLC + VAT payer + Ministry of Health licence (turnover > ₴1M, injectables and class-IV lasers = medical practice; "a network of separate sole traders" = the kind of business splitting the tax service pursues).
Inbound-message handling scenario
Season (autumn–winter = demand peak)
CAC · paid channel
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Cost of one client from paid ads, after the whole funnel
LTV · on gross profit
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On gross profit (~44%), not on revenue. Default ≈ ₴17,742
LTV : CAC
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Healthy threshold for services — from 3.0×. Here consistently higher
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First-visit payback
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What % of CAC is recovered from the first visit's gross profit
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The real constraint
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Average ticket — not "one number", but a weighted mix of 5 service lines
A junior pulls "average ticket" out of thin air. Here it's [D] from the real price list of a direct analog (Slim, slim.ua, 08.09.2026) × each line's share of visits. Shares derived from the real fact "injectables = 50–70% of a healthy cabinet's revenue" (business-broker)
Service line
Visit ticket, ₴ [S]
Share of visits [M-anchored]
Contribution to weighted ticket
Weighted average ticket
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An injectable visit ≈ ₴8,000 — a blend per Slim's price list (slim.ua, exported 08.09.2026): botox/zone ₴3.6–3.9k, multi-zone / Full Face ₴5.6–15k, fillers ₴5–7k/ml, biorevitalisation ₴3.9–8.5k, mesothread packages ₴3.5–12.5k. A client typically does 2–3 zones or a zone + a ml of filler. Injectables' share of revenue = 57% — inside the real "healthy cabinet 50–70%" band (business-broker.com.ua). Diagnostics ₴900 — billed separately, not credited toward procedures ("trust economics").
What moves the economy hardest
Each variable is flexed ±20% in turn (the rest held) and we watch how far LTV:CAC swings — so you can see which lever to pull first, not guess
Sorted from the strongest lever to the weakest (tornado analysis). Note: ad budget and CPL are not at the top. That is the model's main conclusion — see insight #1.
Client acquisition funnel
Paid budget ₴ 60,000/mo · CPL 620₴ → 97 leads
Changes with the scenario — flip the toggle above to see the response-speed effect across the whole funnel. CPL is set conservatively: ₴620 (≈$14) for Meta in premium medical cosmetology; global benchmarks for injectables run higher ($25–50), so this is more of a floor.
Blended CAC: most clients don't come from paid ads
The funnel above only counts CAC for the paid channel. In the "Bible" the source split is: paid 42% · referral 20% · organic 16% · offline 22% — so 58% of clients are almost free
Defaults come from the "LUMÉ Bible" (source register). Change any value — everything recalculates.
Ads and inbound
Client economics
Senior insights of the model
1
LTV:CAC 12–19× — this is a signal NOT to "pour in more budget"
In a niche with a ₴4,000+ ticket and strong organics (referrals are the main channel in cosmetology), the ratio comes out at 9.8× on the paid channel and ~21× blended — far past the 3× threshold. This is not "everything's great", it's a signal: the constraint is not acquisition but cabinet utilisation (76% in the network model, at the capacity ceiling with a waiting list) and retention. Every UAH into retention and capacity right now is worth more than a UAH into ads. That's why the budget and CPL sit at the bottom of the tornado chart.
2
Compute LTV on gross profit, not on the ticket
The ₴4,228 ticket is the client's money. Injectable materials eat 30–50% of the ticket, the doctor's bonus is a % of (ticket − materials), plus a slice of rent and salaries for that visit. Gross margin for LTV ≈ 44%, not 60% (contribution margin). Taking the full ticket into LTV is the classic mistake that nearly doubles it.
3
The first visit nearly pays back acquisition — that's rare
The first visit's gross profit covers ~85–90% of CAC (₴1,800) if you use the weighted ticket. But a new client often starts with something cheaper (diagnostics ₴900, a facial ₴2.1k), so real first-visit payback is closer to 65–75%. Either way — the clinic is nearly in the black from the first touch, not "spreading payback over a year".
4
First-reply speed moves both CAC and retention
Flip the scenario toggle. "Slow reply" lowers both "lead → booking" and the share of "regulars" at once — an anxious client with an expensive procedure goes to whoever calmly replied first (more in Project 2). One operational process (SLA ≤1 min) moves the economy harder than any budget change. Effect sources: industry data + the universal Oldroyd/HBR pattern (not a Ukrainian coefficient — an order-of-magnitude guide).
5
Retrospective: the market went through a full cycle
Studio #1 opened in 2019, survived 2022 as a single location (revenue −21%, demand collapse), and in 2023 got a unique window — demand > supply ~7×, injectable cosmetology in the capital +40%. #2–5 opened on the 2023–2026 upswing. The model reproduces this on the real macro series (FX, inflation, real wages 2021–2026) — see "Market retrospective" in the deep dive.
Retention curve of the regulars' cohort
"42% retention to the 2nd visit" and "~70% annual" is a trajectory: year by year a share of clients drops off. Here is how a cohort of regulars melts over its lifetime
Simplification: geometric decay (the same annual %). The real curve is steeper at the start. There is no monthly Ukrainian-market data — this is an estimate, not a measured curve.
Real Kyiv cosmetology prices (VI–IX.2026)
Cross-checked with Slim, Bellezza, NeoVita, Laserhouse, Dr.Yudina + aggregators. Tag [S], grade B
Procedure
Frequency
Client price, ₴
Dermatocosmetologist consultation
before a course
800–900
Botulinum therapy / zone (forehead, glabella)
every 4–6 mo
3,600–3,900
Botox, multi-zone / Full Face
every 4–6 mo
5,600–15,000
Hyaluronic acid fillers, 1 ml
every 9–18 mo
5,000–7,000
Lip augmentation / correction
every 9–12 mo
6,000–8,000
Biorevitalisation (Profhilo, Belotero, Juvederm)
course of 2–4
3,900–8,500
Mesothreads / thread lift
every 1–2 years
3,500–12,500
Microneedling RF (face)
course of 3–4
6,000–8,500
SMAS lifting Full Face (600 / 1000 lines)
every 1–1.5 years
22,200 / 29,900
Face cleaning (US / combo / classic)
every 1–2 mo
1,500–2,300
Chemical peel
course, in autumn
2,800
Laser hair removal (zone / legs)
course of 6–8, then maintenance
from 200 / from 350
The direct analog used to weight the ticket is Slim (slim.ua): a full price list, course model with a −10–15% discount. "Cosmetology" on OLX/LIGA (~₴1,000 average, Nov 2025) is the mass segment of private practitioners — not a benchmark for a premium clinic.
Likely interview questions
Short answers — full breakdown at the link in the footer
Where did the ₴4,228 average ticket come from — did you make it up?
No. It's a weighted [D]: the real Slim price list (slim.ua, 08.09.2026) split across 5 lines, each line's share of visits derived from the isolated fact "injectables = 50–70% of a healthy cabinet's revenue" (business-broker.com.ua, confirmed twice) — at these tickets, injectables at 30% of visits gives 57% of revenue, inside the band. The calculation table is right above the calculator.
Why is LTV computed on gross profit, not the ticket?
The ticket is the client's money, not the company's. Injectable materials eat 30–50% of it, the doctor's bonus is a percentage of the rest, plus an allocated slice of rent and salaries. Gross margin for LTV ≈ 44%. Computing LTV on the ticket nearly doubles it.
LTV:CAC came out at ~12× — isn't that too good to be true?
Real sources say it is: cosmetology client LTV ₴30–100k/year (business-broker), the two client types (cms.beauty salon figure not applied), retention 70%+; and 58% of clients come by referral, so CAC is low. But 10–22× doesn't mean "printing money": cabinets at 76%, a waiting list — the business is physically constrained, not demand-constrained.
Why is LUMÉ an LLC + VAT + Ministry of Health licence, not a network of sole traders?
Derived, not assumed: network turnover is clearly > ₴1M (the simplified tax regime doesn't apply); injectables and class-IV lasers are medical practice under MoH order #117, which needs a licence; "dozens of sole traders under one brand" is the business-splitting that the tax service and the Bureau of Economic Security have been pursuing in 2025–2026. So the legal structure is effectively the only option.
Why not Altegio for booking?
Per a Forbes Ukraine investigation, Altegio (ex-YCLIENTS) is tied to the Russian holding VK. A cosmetology client's data is effectively medical; for a network positioned on trust, a Russian booking system is a real risk. So — a Ukrainian one (EasyWeek / Appointer). That's an insight worth its own slide.
FX 44.5 — where from?
The official NBU rate on 9 September 2026 is ₴44.47 (the model holds 44.5). The source register (runs 10–12) documents where every client-model figure comes from.
If the budget doubles, what happens to CAC?
In the model — almost nothing (conversions are set as percentages). In reality CAC rises — the cheap audience burns out first. The model doesn't account for that, and that's honestly its limitation. But since the budget isn't the main lever anyway (insight #1), it's not critical.